As the Army transitions out of a decade of war in both Afghanistan and Iraq, the imperative facing today's Army leadership centers around insuring that the beneficial lessons learned out of the past ten years of war are those carried forward into the next decade and implemented throughout the force. Unquestionably, the distributed nature of the conflict in these wars created reliance upon junior leaders in remote locations to conduct operations based upon training and intent, but with minimal guidance during execution. While certain pitfalls arise out of these types of operations, generally speaking, our Army has advanced greatly through the implementation of mission command in our deployed forces. As the conditions of the current battlefield fade with time, how does an Army both cultivate this concept and integrate it into garrison operations, our training and educational base, and preparations for the next conflict?
Just as the field requires preparation for the seed to take root and grow, our Army requires preparation for the concepts of mission command to foster and develop beyond the necessity of the battlefield.
Mission Command: Preparing the Fields for the Seed to Grow
Obedience is a principle, but the man stands above the principle.
-Helmuth von Moltke 1 As the Army transitions out of a decade of war in both Afghanistan and Iraq there will necessarily be a period of change. Whether beset by current economic conditions or the Army's natural tendency to improve through the application of After Action Reviews (AARs), the effect remains the same; the Army will change. With that in mind, the imperative facing today's Army leadership centers around insuring that the beneficial lessons learned out of the past ten years of war are those carried forward into the next decade and implemented throughout the force. Unquestionably, the distributed nature of the conflict in both Iraq and Afghanistan created reliance upon junior leaders in remote locations to conduct operations based upon training and intent, but with minimal guidance during execution. While certain pitfalls arise out of these types of operations, generally speaking, our Army has advanced greatly through the implementation of mission command in our deployed forces. As the conditions of the current battlefield fade with time, how does an Army both cultivate this concept and integrate it into garrison operations, our training and educational base, and preparations for the next conflict? The challenge may be greater than it seems.
To meet this challenge, the Army has moved rapidly to codify mission command and the supporting doctrine in a new manual, published digitally in order to hasten its delivery to the force. Under the new doctrine, mission command is defined as "the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander's intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations." 2 The underlying premise of which is 2 the understanding that there are risks associated with conducting operations; risks mitigated through training and preparation and the trust that forms from superiors observing their subordinates operate successfully. However, this requires that the leader above underwrite those risks as acceptable and reasonable. In a combat environment, there frequently exists little option but to trust one's subordinate. Yet in the garrison environment, especially one characterized by declining budgets, shrinking resources, and few competing requirements, the likelihood that the hard-earned trust of the battlefield will remain seems doubtful. One needs only to look at the recently published message to All Army Activities (ALARACT) outlining the requirements for suicide stand-down to appreciate how difficult this challenge will be.
Though this challenge seems great, it is not insurmountable. Just as the field requires preparation for the seed to take root and grow, our Army requires preparation for the concepts of mission command to foster and develop beyond the necessity of the battlefield. This begins with culture. From top to bottom, the Army must cultivate the proper culture if it truly desires to maintain the successful leadership gains of the past decade of conflict. Within this context, this paper will discuss the concept of mission command, its value to our Army, and the potential barriers to implementation in a nondeployed environment. Further, I will discuss the culture associated with successful mission command and why the Army must cultivate same if mission command is to successfully remain as the cornerstone of our leadership doctrine. Finally, I will address those measures undertaken towards implementation, thus far, as a potential indicator of success and offer recommendations for the process.
3
What is Mission Command?
Before one can have a meaningful discussion about the merits or shortcomings of mission command, a basis for understanding must be established. As referenced above, Army doctrinal Publication (ADP) 6-0 serves as the Army's capstone doctrinal manual on the subject. Three principle components enable the exercise of mission command by leaders in support of unified land operations as depicted in the chart on the following page. The mission command philosophy, defined above, outlines six principles "to assist commanders and staff in balancing the art of command and the science of control." 3 These include: building cohesive teams through trust; creating shared understanding; providing a clear commander's intent; the exercise of disciplined initiative; the use of mission orders; and acceptance of prudent risk. 4 In turn, these principles and the philosophy they support are executed through the mission command warfighting function, which is the "related tasks and systems that develop and integrate those activities enabling a commander to balance the art of command and the science of control." 5 Finally, the entire process is enabled by the mission command system which includes the personnel, networks, facilities, equipment, processes and procedures that provides the capability to exercise mission command. 6 Simply put, this manual holistically establishes the philosophical underpinnings of mission command;
provides the doctrine which supports its application to Army warfighting procedures; and finally, defines the linkages between the doctrine and those systems which support its The opportunity presented by the current circumstances is more than just anecdotal as it literally determines whether or not the cultural and conditional 'soil' will support the adoption of mission command. First, the principles as executed over the past eleven years are already ingrained across our Army and the joint force, writ large.
Whether through mandate or happenstance, our Army has successfully implemented these practices to great effect during the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Moreover, the duration of these conflicts has insured that a whole generation of Soldiers has known nothing but this doctrine. As such, the circumstances surrounding the inculcation of mission command may be less about creation and more about preventing their loss through gains in leadership which were 'hard-earned' on the battlefields of Southwest Asia.
Second, the old maxim 'timing is everything,' applies equally to the implementation of mission command. As the United States faces the greatest economic crisis since the great depression, one cannot help but appreciate that the military will shoulder its fare share of the economic burden. Historically, the military faced periods of both down-sizing and retraction into the continental United States at the conclusion of conflict to both reduce costs and refit the force. With the removal of forces from Iraq, reduction of forces in Europe, and a publicized timeline to bring the majority of elements out of Afghanistan, the current pattern seems to follow historical precedents.
Herein lies both the opportunity and the potential pitfalls facing implementation.
The opportunity presents through the fact that the concepts of this doctrine are largely embedded in our force, greatly mitigating traditional start-up costs associated with implementing a "new" doctrine. As General Dempsey stated in his white paper on 7 mission command, "trust informs the execution of [the commander's] intent." 8 The basis for this trust derives from a regimen of training and experience resident in subordinates.
Unlike periods where the Army finds itself expanding and thus, has the benefit of manpower but not necessarily experience, drawdowns-especially those following a protracted conflict-present circumstances where both training levels and experience are in surplus. This may well be the decisive element which allows mission command to take root in our Army where it has failed to do so in the past.
The downside and potential pitfall derives from the same circumstances. Raised in an era where trust was given under the most dire of circumstances, the current generation of Army leaders through the rank of lieutenant colonel, have largely known nothing but mission command and its application in a deployed environment. However, the withholding of that same trust in a garrison environment where impacts are less but controls are greater, seems to be leading many to doubt whether leaders are willing to allow subordinates the freedom to execute under the principles of mission command. fundamental concept serves to form the most basic and critical bond between leaders and the led. It is the empowering principle that, when combined with initiative and discipline, enables the incredible outcomes observed in our junior leaders in those places and at times where higher control is absent. These form the foundational building blocks at the lowest levels of mission command.
Covey goes on to discuss this relationship to productivity in the business world.
In his discussion of the 'economics of trust,' he states that, "trust always affects two outcomes-speed and cost. When trust goes down, speed will also go down and costs will go up." 12 Conversely, "when trust goes up, speed will also go up and costs will go down." Applied to operations within the military, those costs represent the efficiency of our operations which must be addressed in times of austerity. Even more importantly, in wartime these costs are measured [potentially] in the lives of Soldiers.
Colonel Tom Guthrie provides several simple scenarios in his writings on the subject which are useful in demonstrating this concept. 13 The most basic of these scenarios centers around one of the Army's most time-honored traditions-the conduct of physical training. At most installations, physical training or "PT" occurs from 0630-0730 daily. It typically begins with large formations and then breaks down into smaller ability groups where subordinate leaders, using their initiative and better knowledge of those in their group, lead subordinates through exercises to build endurance, flexibility, and conditioning. On the one hand, coordinated timing of these events allows for the blocking off of roads for safety, synchronization of schedules, and provides a measure of predictability in a Soldier's day. But what happens, as Guthrie poses, if a subordinate leader (Lieutenant X) decides that his platoon needs more than just an hour or that the 9 weather later in the day is more conducive to workouts. In this simplest of examples, the tension of extending the trust to subordinates who wish to exercise initiative can be seen, and easily squashed for reasons of synchronization and homogeneity. So why
give the trust when clearly, there exist valid reasons for conducting PT at the same time and in the same format? The "trust dividend" takes this concept a step farther.
When trust is high, the dividend you receive is like a performance multiplier, elevating and improving every dimension of your organization and your life…In a company, high trust materially improves communication, collaboration, execution, innovation, strategy, engagement, partnering, and relationships with all stake holders. Age' scholars Donald S. Alberts and Richard E. Hayes, He presents a spectrum of "command and control approaches" to define where mission command fits within the differing types of leadership doctrines. 16 The spectrum ranges on one end from "Order specific" which is exemplified by the Chinese Peoples' Liberation Army (PLA), and characterized by centralized control and the use of detailed orders with little room for variation or initiative, to "Mission specific," exuding low levels of control as exemplified by the Israeli Army and the German Wehrmacht during World War II. The area between these two ends of the spectrum they title "Objective specific," which defines the band of leadership doctrine predominantly occupied by the western armies of today, inclusive of the British, Canadian Forces, and the United States Army. 17 Within the rubric of the "Objective specific" category, they further delineate between "problem bounding" and "problem solving" approaches. Indicative of the Commonwealth armies where objectives are presented in more general terms, they
propose that "problem bounding directives are less detailed than those issued by commanders in problem solving environments-often by a factor of three to one, reflecting this lack of detail." 18 In contrast, Alberts and Hayes suggest that the US Army adopted 'problem solving' methods characterized by more substantial guidance, focusing not only on the objectives to be met, but how they are to be accomplished.
A rational person might question why this matters. First, it provides insights into how other armies view our methods of operation as a military. More importantly, it gives a reasonably objective characterization of where we are culturally within the spectrum of mission command doctrine, and where we need to go as seen through the eyes of our closest allies. Finally, it lends credence to the value of this doctrine by those who've adopted its use through successful incorporation in their own armies and their appreciation of the potential that comes with successful implementation in the U.S.
Army.
Changing Culture and "The Gaps"
Though the discussion thus far is critical to the future of the Army, one could largely relegate it to the realm of small unit leadership and experiences at the brigadelevel and below. However, implementation of this doctrine across the Army in specific terms, and the joint force writ-large becomes a problem orders-of-magnitude larger.
That said, addressing this type of problem is not without precedent, as many large corporations and multi-national organizations have had to emplace cultural changes over the years in order to remain viable in the workplace. cannot know enough about them to program them perfectly." 22 Potentially, this has the most pertinence to mission command because its impact coincides directly with the concepts of the doctrine. Guidance is provided to achieve an effect, but how that guidance is perceived and acted upon determines the methods used to accomplish the desired result.
The final gap he addresses occurs between actions and outcomes and concerns effects: "It is the difference between what we hope our actions will achieve and what they actually achieve. We can never fully predict how the environment will react to what 13 we do. It means that we cannot know in advance exactly what outcomes the actions of our organization are going to create." 23 Here we refer to acclaimed organizational scholar, Peter Senge. In his book,
The Fifth Discipline; The Art and Practice of a Learning Organization, Senge discusses systems thinking and its value toward understanding problems of increasing complexity.
In particular, systems thinking provides a method "for seeing wholes. It is a framework for seeing interrelationships rather than things, for seeing patterns of change rather than static "snapshots." 24 Unequivocally, the strategic "re-culturing" of the Army, across the multitude of organizations, agencies, and posts requires a holistic appreciation of the second, third, and "n th order" effects which will occur during this process. He also joins other organizational scholars in cautioning that, undertakings of this magnitude must be iterative in order to succeed. To address this anticipated frustration surrounding changes in a learning organization, Senge provides what he terms "The Laws of the Fifth Discipline," all of which provide insight toward the Army's way ahead. 25 
Making the Case
As with any new doctrine published, there must be a focused effort to educate the current members of the force on the changes while simultaneously indoctrinating new members of the military when they join. The Army's emphasis on suicide prevention and its associated chain teachings and stand-down days come to mind as only the most recent example. Because this is important to our Army, its emphasis echoed from the mouth of every senior leader with accompanying graphic aids and a mandated timeline for execution by the force.
The adoption of mission command, though less immediate in its necessity than addressing suicides, should receive similar emphasis across the force in terms of both breadth and scope. However, the current efforts appear to fall short, either of educating the force or providing rationale as to why its adoption is important. The publication of ADP 6-0, Mission Command, demonstrates this clearly. Though provided to the Army via digital media, the emphasis on why adoption of this doctrine was important was left largely to self-discovery and a documents search of Army briefings provides only cursory references from senior leaders, most of which are dated seven months ago.
As a trainer at the Army's Joint Maneuver Readiness Center in Hohenfels, Germany, the task to train this doctrine in Cavalry Squadrons and Tank Battalions fell to me and a handful of selected former battalion commanders. Each of us commanded an understanding of the tactical concepts of the doctrine, having led formations in combat where mission command reigned as a necessity out of distributed operations as much as canon to be followed. In that regard and the tactical scenarios presented at the training center, its adoption clearly displayed tactical merit. However, there exists a considerable gap between the 'tactical benefit' observed at the training center and the vision of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, who states that "mission command must be institutionalized and operationalized into all aspects of the joint force." 26 Pertaining to mission command, leaders have addressed time and again the need to establish the proper culture to allow it to cultivate. That said, the literature produced thus far, only provides a cursory, "one over the Army" view. In order to
properly establish a culture for mission command to take root, the Army must first decide upon what aspects of our culture will carry forward. To better appreciate the criticality of this step, organizational theorist Edgar Schein provides a simplified definition of culture for understanding:
A pattern of shared basic assumptions that was learned by a group as it solved problems of external adaptation and internal integration that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems." 27 These are further broken down into three distinctive levels which establish the fundamental building blocks that underpin the way in which an organization sees itself.
Artifacts are those "visible products of an organization such as structure, procedures, and technology; rites and rituals; design of physical space; tales of important events and celebrated heroes; and formal statements such as mission and vision." Lastly, basic underlying assumptions "reflect a marked preference for certain solutions to problems, adopted on the basis of past preference." 30 Simply stated, historical successes produce a range of outcomes, some of which are more desirable than others and the organization will tend to gravitate toward those which most optimally address an issue. As an Army, we learn through teaching subordinates principles that work and then incorporate these into to a training regimen so that they become ingrained in the force. Succinctly put, leaders are afforded "multiple avenues through which to affect change," 31 these include:
 What they pay attention to, measure and control;
 Their reaction to critical incidents and organizational crisis; have a common understanding of its goals and direction." 36 In order to transform this effort from "brilliance which fails to reach its intended audience" into a vision that "resonates in the hearts of the force," the Army must seize the opportunity before it.
Like a fumbled handoff, the Army simply needs to pick up the ball and run with it.
This begins with a simple, understandable product, capable of communicating the vision to every level. The White Paper accomplishes this more than satisfactorily.
Next, repetitive communication via multiple forums insures that the vision gets communicated to the target audience and reinforced over time. Here again, refer to the ALARACT message for implementing a "suicide awareness" stand-down. That effort was accompanied with clear implementation guidance, accompanying explanatory graphics, and a feedback mechanism to the Army's senior leadership. The difference between the two efforts offers stark contrast. Finally, through leadership by example and dialogue with their audience, seeming inconsistencies can be addressed to insure that the message remains as intended. 37 The Way Ahead Just because valued concepts are penned in a well-articulated tome does not guarantee their implementation. As this paper and numerous other articles have expressed already, the further inculcation of mission command will require a cultural change which has failed to take root previously, despite its espoused benefits. The complexity of this task merits a systems approach to fully appreciate and anticipate the responses that will ensue as implementation continues. As one scholar put it:
Leaders play a crucial role in the process of culture change as they both shape and are shaped by culture. Leaders represent the culture in which they themselves matured; conversely, leadership is distinguished from management primarily by its capacity to generate cultural change. In situations where the gap between "theory in use" and "espoused theory" generate dysfunction, leaders must identify and steer a course for change. 38 However, the verity that realizing this change in culture is difficult does not minimize the worthiness of the venture. Rather, the fact that much of the "heavy lifting"
has already occurred through leadership gains in combat and a well-crafted vision should motivate the Army and its senior leadership to see it through to completion. The foundations for this leadership transformation find themselves throughout the history of the U.S. Army and continue today. Moreover, the gains achieved through eleven years of war should both motivate senior leaders to maintain visibility of the potential rewards and convict us from the costs already incurred in combat, driving our Army to fully develop and implement mission command doctrine.
In its most basic form, our institution has three tasks before it to close the gaps between the strategy for mission command and executing its implementation: Decide what really matters; Get the message across; And give people space and support. 39 The trusted initiative of our able subordinates will take care of the rest, and that after all, is the essence of mission command.
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